KEY MESSAGES

Migration and displacement closely interact with education. This happens through intricate two-way relationships that affect those who move, those who stay behind or those who host migrants and refugees:

• Migration and displacement call on education systems to be prepared. Countries need to recognize migrants’ and refugees’ right to education in law and fulfil this right in practice.
• Education also profoundly affects migration and displacement – both their volume and how they are perceived.
• The world endorsed two global compacts on migrants and refugees in December 2018, which, among other, outline key commitments on education for the first time.

No part of the world is currently as much affected by migration and displacement as the Arab States. The region accounts for 5% of the global population but 32% of the global population of refugees and 38% of the global population of people internally displaced by conflict. Although migration offers opportunities, humanitarian crises have slowed down the pace of education development in the region relative to other regions, undermining the prospects of this and future generations. For instance, over the past two decades:

• The gap in the enrolment rate in primary education between the Arab States and sub-Saharan Africa has been more than halved.
• Central and Southern Asia has overtaken the Arab States in the enrolment rate in lower secondary education.
• The enrolment rate in upper secondary education in the Arab States exceeded the global average by 2.5 percentage points but is now falling short of it by 2.5 percentage points.

This report on the implications of migration and displacement for education in the Arab States reviews evidence with the aim of answering two questions:

• How do population movements affect access to and quality of education, and what are the implications for individual migrants and refugees?
• How can and does education make a difference in the lives of people who move and stay behind and in the communities that send and receive them?

The following four chapters discuss how internal migration, cross-border migration, cross-border displacement and internal displacement affect education access, quality and inclusiveness in the Arab States – but also in countries that receive migrants and refugees from the Arab States. They ask whether education outcomes of migrants, refugees and other displaced people differ from those of natives, why gaps emerge and what the main barriers are to provision of good-quality, inclusive education. The final chapter offers conclusions and recommendations.

First, Gulf Cooperation Council countries have the highest immigration rates in the world. In Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, immigrants are the majority both in the overall and in the student population.

• Bahrain is the only country in the group with open access to the public school system for migrants, which make up about half of public school students.
• But in line with an immigration policy that promotes segmentation, other countries in the group cater for migrants through a private education system, where access and quality are linked to ability to pay. Immigrants make up 73% of private school students in Kuwait, 81% in Qatar and 83% in the United Arab Emirates.
• Private schools represent a lucrative market in these countries, valued at some US$13.2 billion in 2016/17 and expected to double to US$26.2 billion by 2023. These private schools offer curricula mostly in line with the country of origin of the student body. The 194 private schools in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, offer 17 different curricula.
• Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have made efforts to ensure that all private school students learn Arabic to a good standard and are taught through a common social studies curriculum. The effectiveness of these initiatives has not been assessed, while two-thirds of Arab youth aged 18 to 24 reported speaking more English than standard Arabic in their daily lives in 2017.
• In Kuwait, the stateless bidoon students can only attend fee-paying private schools (US$860 to US$1,550 per year) although the government subsidizes 70% of these fees.
• An extraordinary expansion of tertiary education has taken place, particularly in the private sector, to meet increased demand from nationals and expatriate residents. In Oman there are 27 non-public universities and the number of tertiary education students increased from 16,000 in 1998 and 132,000 in 2016.
• The Arab States display higher student mobility than the global average. The outbound mobility ratio increased from 3.1% in 2009 to 4.3% in 2017, while the inbound mobility ratio in the Arab States increased from 2.3% in 2006 to 3.2% in 2017, reaching 35% in Qatar and 49% in the United Arab Emirates.
• Internationalization in higher education came with a switch from Arabic to English as a language of instruction. In Bahrain, the National Higher Education Strategy aims to produce global citizens able to communicate well in English. Royal decrees in Saudi Arabia introduced English at the pre-university level and various reforms. In the United Arab Emirates English is the language of instruction for sciences and mathematics.„
• Until recently, expatriate Arab, mostly Egyptian and Jordanian, teachers were making up about 87% of teachers in government schools in Qatar and 90% in government boys’ schools in the United Arab Emirates. However, they are being replaced by English-speaking recruits, largely from high-income countries, who are hired under much more favourable terms.

Second, regional emigration rates are above the global average of 3.4%, notably in Lebanon (12%) but also in the Maghreb countries of Algeria, Tunisia and especially Morocco (8%).

• The highest – and rising – shares of the total immigrant population from Arab States are found in France (37%; of which 95% from the Maghreb) and Sweden (18%; of which 75% from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic). The share of 15-year-old students with migrant background is 26% in France and 31% in Sweden.
• Remittances have a positive impact on household education expenditure. The countries receiving the most remittances are Egypt (US$20 billion), in absolute terms, and Palestine (13% of GDP), in relative terms. The cost of remitting to the Arab States is 7.3%, close to the global average.
• Yemen has the lowest adult financial literacy rate in the world, at 13%, while Tunisia had the highest among Arab States, at 45%. Financial education programmes for migrants can have a positive impact on financial decisions as a study of Indian migrants in Qatar has shown.
• Immigrant students of Arab origin often leave education early or are streamed into vocational tracks. In Amsterdam, 9% of second-generation immigrant students from Morocco entered vocational tracks in lower secondary school at age 12, compared with 2% of natives.
• Lack of language proficiency is an education disadvantage. In western Europe, participation of Moroccan immigrants in language courses in the first four years after immigration is associated with a positive and long-term impact on language skills and social contacts. But language training needs to be combined with content learning as early as possible.
• Immigrant students from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia do worse in France. For instance, 25% of them repeat a grade compared to 15% on average. But once their socioeconomic background is taken into account, their academic results do not differ from those of native French students.
• Moreover, about 69% of native French parents and 76% of parents of Northern African background wish their children to attend higher education. The gap more than doubles when background factors are considered.
• Lebanon and Morocco have the largest highly skilled emigration rates, about one in four. The effect of the prospect for skilled migration on human capital accumulation can be positive in sending countries, reaching a maximum at 14%, a moderate rate of high-skilled migration.

A third emerging trend is that sub-Saharan African migrants increasingly settle in Northern Africa. In Morocco, the government is developing policies and a framework to guide their integration into the education system. About 5,500 immigrant children were enrolled in 2017/18.

Libya has become a gateway for sub-Saharan Africans heading for Europe. In 2018, an estimated 62,000 school-age refugee and migrant children were registered in Libya, of whom about 53,000 needed support for education access. No unaccompanied and separated children had access to education. Education is not free for many of these children. Learning opportunities for those who cannot gain access to formal schools are scarce, and non-formal education is nearly non-existent.

While the Syrian Arab Republic has by far the highest percentage of internally displaced people (IDPs) as a share of the population (36%), Yemen (8%) and Iraq, Palestine and Sudan (each about 5%) are among the top 12 countries on this list.

In Iraq, internal displacement has declined from 3.4 million at the height of the conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in March 2016.

• There are 1.6 million IDPs. Of these, almost 700,000 live in the Kurdistan region and 90,000, or 5%, live in camps.
• A 2018 needs assessment indicated that 42% of IDP children and youth aged 6 to 17 living in camps attended formal education, compared with 60% of IDP children living in host communities and 73% of non-displaced children.
• Among the challenges is the small number of Arabic-language schools and uncertainty over whether qualifications from Kurdistan region schools will be recognized, as the curriculum is different. Schools for IDPs have been established to teach the official curriculum in Arabic. These are hosted in school buildings belonging to the Kurdistan regional Ministry of Education. Education directorates and school administrators in the region have adapted school schedules and activities to accommodate shifts for IDP students. However, schools may be far from home for IDPs living in host communities.
• The Federal Ministry of Education has developed an updated accelerated learning curriculum and materials for IDP students. But those aged 12 to 17 represent 68% of out-of-school children, while accelerated learning centres only cover primary school curriculum. There are no other structured and officially recognized opportunities for adolescents to develop academic skills.

In Sudan, conflict over the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states has resulted in periodic clashes and displacements but the main source of displacement is the conflict in the five Darfur states.

• As of 2019, there are an estimated 1.9 million IDPs, of whom 1.6 million live in camps. The precarious situation of IDPs and nomadic communities is exacerbated by food insecurity, economic hardship and protection concerns.
• The Ministry of Education supports 360 primary schools in camps across the seven most affected states, serving about 260,000 children. Although most of these communities have been displaced for years or even decades, the government assumes IDPs will be resettled or return home and offers only temporary arrangements, including provision of supplies and construction. Camp communities therefore construct and annually reconstruct these temporary learning spaces. About 21% of schools in South Kordofan and 13% in West Darfur are unusable.
• „Teacher availability and qualifications constitute a major challenge in these states. Many teachers are volunteers, and around half are not trained as teachers. Training for the other half typically consists of a two week course at most. The Ministry of Education does not supervise, train or pay volunteer teachers. Schools and alternative learning centres recruit volunteer teachers, usually from the local community. Each school’s parent-teacher association raises community funds to pay teachers.

In the Syrian Arab Republic, there remain more than 6 million IDPs, of which 52% are children and 86% live in urban areas.

• In 2019, 76% of IDPs said they did not plan to resettle. About 5.9 million children needed education services, of whom at least 29% were internally displaced; 2.1 million children are out of school.
• Until recently, there had been relative stability in five zones of political and military control. Most authorities used a variation of the government curriculum, but assessment, progression and placement are largely missing or in nascent stages of development or revision. Despite the Whole of Syria coordination function, political agendas and security constraints have limited cooperation.
• Only government-affiliated schools provide widely recognized certification and displaced children in opposition-held areas seeking access to examinations in government-held schools face risks, including exposure of their families’ names to government authorities, physical security threats at checkpoints and the insecurity of areas between zones of control.
• Roughly one-third of schools, mostly in the north, where 60% of IDPs live, are unusable due to acts of war and the use of schools for purposes other than education.
• A 2018 report found that 13% of children required specialized psychosocial support in the classroom to facilitate learning and well-being.
• Internally displaced teachers often remain under home district management, leading to risk and administrative hurdles that make collecting salaries virtually impossible.

In Yemen, conflict has divided the country since 2015 into a northern part, ruled by the Houthis in Sana’a, and a southern part, ruled by the internationally recognized government in Aden.

• The presence of two ministries is a challenge for humanitarian actors. The Education Cluster leads education programme implementation, mostly through national NGOs due to security concerns.
• There are currently 2.3 million IDPs. There are 1,272 IDP-hosting sites sheltering 465,000 people. Most do not hold temporary classes unless the camp is more than 5 km from the nearest school. What temporary classes are available are only for grades 1 to 5.
• Overcrowding has worsened. Many schools are damaged, schools are the public buildings most frequently used to shelter IDPs, the number of children is growing, and classroom construction has stopped. IDPs are more likely to be discriminated because of their dialect or appearance.
• „Like other civil servants in Houthi-controlled governorates, teachers have not received their salaries since 2016. The Houthis suspended many humanitarian programmes in 2017 to put pressure on them to pay teacher salaries. UNICEF started making incentive payments to teachers, equivalent to US$50 per month but the first payment to 97,000 teachers due in September 2018 was delayed because the Aden-based ministry wanted the 2014 teacher list and claimed the list submitted by the Sana’a-based ministry included Houthi followers.
• The Sana’a-based government has struggled to print textbooks after donors withdrew funding following edits to the Arabic, religion, history and social studies textbooks.

• Protect the right to education of migrants and displaced people
• Prepare teachers of migrants and refugees to address diversity and hardship
• Include migrants and displaced people in national education systems
• Harness the potential of migrants and displaced people
• Understand and plan for the education needs of migrants and displaced people
• Support education needs of migrants and displaced people in humanitarian and development aid
• Represent migration and displacement histories in education accurately to challenge prejudices